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August, 1951
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR INJURIES TO
A SPOUSE IN COLORADO
HAMLET J. BARRY, JR.*
of the Denver Bar
Until the passage of the Colorado Married Women's Act in
1868, this state presumably followed the common law doctrine
that a married woman merges into the single legal entity repre-
sented by her husband. Apparently under the common law doc-
trine the wife had no cause of action for recovery for personal
injuries. However, judicial recognition prior to the Married Wom-
en's Act did allow the wife to join with her husband in a suit to
recover for her injuries. She could not bring such an action in
her own behalf unless at the time of instituting action her husband
was dead or had deserted her.
The Married Women's Act passed in 1868 in Colorado recog-
nized that a wife Had a right to own property, but limited its
transfer by requiring that her husband join in any conveyance.
Finally, in 1874, by legislative enactment, it was provided that a
wife could sue or be sued in all matters as if she were sole. Pro-
visions to the same effect are to be found in the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure' and in the Colorado Statutes.
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In the case of Rains v. Rains,3 where a wife was allowed to
sue her husband for damages for personal injuries caused by his
negligence, the common law fiction of unity was clearly disavowed.
The language used by the court in the Rains case was rather
strong, and the court held: "Whatever may be the law elsewhere,
if the common law fiction of unity ever existed in this state, it
does not exist here now."
The strong language of this case was obviously not intended
to afford a wife equal position with her husband in regard to the
elements of damages which she may recover for injury to her
husband by the negligent acts of third persons. In this respect,
however, Colorado does not stand alone, since it appears to be
the law of 47 of the 48 states that a wife is not entitled to recover
for her loss of consortium and services resulting from injuries to
her husband. Only in Georgia does the question remain unsettled.
4
COMMON LAW RIGHTS REMAIN
Almost uniformly, then, the Married Women's Acts do not
take away from the husband his common law right to recover
against third persons for his loss sustained because of the depriva-
tion of his wife's services, society and companionship. Likewise,
because he is under an obligation to support his wife, the husband,
* Mr. Barry was assisted in the preparation of this article by Thomas W. Glbb,
student, University of Denver College of Law.
'Rule 17 (1941).
'COLO. STAT. ANN.. C. 108, § 2 (1935).
'97 Colo. 19, 46 P. 2d 740 (1935).4
1McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E. 2d 299 (1949).
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in addition, is entitled to recover for a iy expenses incurred as a
result of his wife's injury and for any expenses that may ultimately
be incurred in cases of permanent injury. However, there can
be no double recovery for such expenses; if the wife has in fact
paid such expenses and anticipates paying future expense, she
may recover those expenses in her own action.
In the case of Denver Consolidated Tramway Co. v. Riley,5
the court approved an instruction which rather clearly outlines
the husband's elements of damages for injuries to his wife by
third persons. This case followed by many years the enactment
of the Married Women's Act, and tends to emphasize the husband's
common law right. An instruction in the Denver Consolidated
Tramway Co. case allowed the plaintiff husband to recover for
expenses already incurred in endeavoring to effect a cure as well
as for future expenses necessary to the same end, and for the loss
-past, present and prospective-of the society of his wife caused
by her injury.
Under the present status of the law in Colorado, a husband
will be entitled to recover, against a third party whose negligence
has caused injury to his wife, the following elements of damage:
(1) The husband is allowed to recover for expenses incurred and
for expenses which will be incurred in the future in the treatment
of the wife's injury. (2) The husband may also recover for the
past, present and prospective loss of his wife's services. (The
term "services" is interpreted to mean financial loss resulting from
the deprivation to the husband of his wife's services as housekeeper
and mother of the children.6 ) (3) The husband may be allowed to
recover for his loss of consortium, which is generally interpreted
to mean the loss of society and companionship of his wife.
For injury to the wife, the wife herself may recover: (1)
Damages for physical and mental pain and suffering. (2) Past
and prospective loss of earnings. (Losses resulting from her
inability to perform duties within the home are excluded.) (3)
Medical expenses in fact paid or incurred by the wife personally.
(4) In the case of Duffy v. Gross, 7 it is indicated that a wife is
entitled, independently of the husband's right, to recover damages
for her inability to labor. From this it might seem to follow that
a wife is entitled to recover for her loss of earnings whether or
not she actually is engaged in employment outside the home. The
case of Duffy v. Gross does not, however, rely upon the principle
of loss of earnings as such, but states that the inability to perform
labor is a form of mental suffering which is difficult to endure,
particularly when the injured person prior to the accident is a
normal, healthy person.
The husband's cause of action is a complete, separate cause
of action which arises concurrently with the injury and is de-
rivative only insofar as the wife's contributory negligence will
14 Colo. App. 132, 59 P. 476 (1899).
'Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N. H. 289, 99 A. 298 (1916).
121 Colo. 198, 214 P. 2d 498 (1950).
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defeat his recovery. Accordingly, a finding of contributory negli-
gence in the action of one spouse against the third person is not
res judicata to a later action brought -by the other spouse.8
There appears to be no cause of action for the wife's recovery
against third persons for injuries to her husband. In the case of
Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Company,9 the husband had
recovered in an earlier action for his injuries, and his wife had
brought this action for the alleged loss of the society and the
consortium of her husband. The defendant's demurrer on the
grounds that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of action was sustained by the trial court. Such ruling
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Colorado. In this affirm-
ance the court did point out that there might be one instance in
which a wife could recover for the loss of consortium. This excep-
tion would obtain where there has been direct impairment of the
right of consortium, i.e., in an action based upon alienation of
affections. This decision was made in view of the latest provisions
of the Married Women's Act and indicates quite clearly that the
act has not, to date, been interpreted to strengthen the wife's
position to recover for injuries to her husband.
WHERE INJURY CAUSES DEATH
So much for damages for injury to a spouse caused by third
persons-. This discussion logically leads to the question of what
may be recovered when the injury to the spouse results in death.
Covering the husband's rights, we have the case of the American
Insurance Company v. Naylor 10 wherein the husband brought two
actions for the injuries and death of his wife caused by the de-
fendant's negligence. The death action, of course, was brought
under the Wrongful Death Statute. The second action was for
damages to compensate the husband for the loss of his wife's serv-
ices, companionship and society between the date of her injury and
the date of her death, and also for compensation to him covering
medical expenses, including hospital and nursing costs, necessarily
incurred by him during that period. The cases were tried together,
and the plaintiff recovered judgments on both causes of action.
Upon appeal the defendant contended that recovery by the plain-
tiff under the Wrongful Death Statute barred his action for loss
of consortium and expenses. Upon this point the court ruled that
the causes of action were separate and did not exclude each other.
Although it is clear that a wife cannot collect damages for
an injury to a husband, she is certainly entitled to recovery under
the Wrongful Death Statute; she is, in fact, one of the class of per-
sons named who has a right of action for the death of her husband
under that statute. Under the statute, a wife was entitled to re-
cover from a third person her pecuniary loss resulting from her
husband's death.
SGilma n v. Gilman, 51 A. 2d 46 (Vt., 1947).
'101 Colo. 258, 75 P. 2d 1100 (1937).
10101 Colo. 41, 70 P. 2d 353 (1937).
DICTA
Until the case of Fish v. Liley," it was generally believed that
a cause of action for wrongful death to a. husband did not survive
the death of a tort-feasor, inasmuch as the survival statute barred
all actions for injuries to the person upon the death of the tort-
feasor. In Fish v. Liley, recovery was allowed against the deceased
tort-feasor's estate on the grounds that the right to recover against
the deceased tort-feasor was a property right which survived and
was therefore not an action for trespass for injuries to the person.
It is to be presumed that this doctrine may be extended to include
all persons who were entitled to recover under the Wrongful Death
Statute, including parents, children, and a suit by the husband
against the deceased tort-feasor for the death of his wife.
Perhaps the Fish v. Liley case has further extensions. The
reasoning in the case might open a new avenue for a wife to seek
recovery for injuries which do not result in death. Strictly con-
strued, this case recognizes that a wife has a property right in
the continued life of her husband, the amount of which is meas-
ured by her pecuniary loss upon his death. It does 'not take a great
deal of imagination on the basis of this case to see the possibility
that the court might find that the wife has a property right in the
continued physical well-being of her husband and in his continued
availability as a handyman, chauffeur, mechanic and father. Such
loss can be measured with some degree of certainty in much the
same way as the courts measure a husband's right to recover for
the loss of his wife's services as housekeeper, nurse and mother.
CASE COMMENTS
DAMAGES-RECOVERY OF EXPENSES OF LITIGATION IN A SUB-
SEQUENT ACTION-Landis was sued in a tort action by McGowan.
Pikes Peak Company was joined as a defendant, and cross claimed
against Landis as an indemnitor and for costs of defending against
McGowan's action. Costs were awarded the Pikes Peak Company,
as well as to McGowan, who was successful in that litigation. An
appeal was taken by Landis, and Pikes Peak Company only par-
ticipated to defend the costs awarded by the lower court.' Landis
paid the judgments. Sun Indemnity Co., as subrogee of Pikes
Peak Co. now sues Landis for expense of taking depositions for
use in the prior trial, and attorney fees and disbursements, includ-
ing $250 for services of attorneys in connection with the appellate
proceedings wherein Pikes Peak Co. obtained affirmance of its
judgment against Landis.
"120 Colo. 156, 208 P. 2d 930 (1949).
'Landis v. McGowan, 114 Colo. 355, 165 P. 2d 180 (1946).
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